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normative and positive economics

the politicians compete are votes. Thus it is
crucial for their success that they design the
content of party programs and election platforms as closely as possible to their voters'
preferences, and, simultaneously, as far away as
possible from competing parties. The observed
tendency toward "median voter" programs and
increasing political competition can be analyzed and explained by the niche approach.
Niches can be formed and created, especially
through advertising. Consumers and voters can
react and change their preferences, and a
formerly well-adjusted fIrm will exit because
of a vanishing niche. The exact identifIcation of
the boundaries of the niche is one of the major
problems, both in theory and reality. The niche
is not a crisp set, but rather a fuzzy set.
Conclusion

Comprehensive theoretical models of niches
are not yet well developed in economics. The
existing approaches are often too close to
biological terms and they lack distinct economic content. They offer, however, a better
instrument for explaining competitive behavior
in segmented markets than do "orthodox"
economics. Market segmentation was formerly
descriptive, and the concept of niches allows
the identifIcation of strategies and the prediction of future developments. Niche theory is a
rather universal concept applying to marketing,
product placement, spatial placement and even
ideological platforms of politics. It is a strong
analytical tool for all situations where we have
to explain competition, why it takes place or
not, and how one can evade it.
See also:

evolutionary economics: major contemporary
themes; producer and consumer sovereignty
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normative and positive
economics
Virtually every mainstream textbook in economics begins with a brief discussion of the
difference between positive and normative
economics, made a dogma by those who
slavishly followed Lionel Robbins in his Essay
on the Nature and Significance of Economic
Science (1932). For example, Schotter's Microeconomics states that:

normative and positive "economics

Normative or welfare economics deals with
what ought to be rather than what is and
involves prescriptive statements that may be
based on value judgments. Positive economics deals with what is rather than what ought
to be and involves descriptive statements
that are objective and verifiable.
(Schotter 1994: 4)
Schotter's emphasis is not unusual. Since
positive economics is thought to be objective
and verifiable, normative economics by implication is subjective and not subject to rigorous
validation. This view is inherited from David
Hume, who argued that a gulf exists between
"is" and "ought"; and, more recently, from the
1930s logical positivists, who claimed both that
scientific statements alone are rational and that
scientific statements are those that are empirically verifiable. Mainstream economists, accordingly, claim that their work is scientific on
account of its being value-neutral.
Facts are theory-laden

Economic methodologists, however, deny that
empirical evidence confirms a theory as scientific, because disconfirming evidence may always turn up in the future, and because any
given set of facts may give support to conflicting theories. They also deny that theories that
stand up to empirical tests designed to falsify
theories must be scientific, because theorists
can always add immunizing, auxiliary assumptions to protect core principles. Accordingly, it
has not been shown that theories are scientific
in virtue of their relation to facts and evidence.
Indeed, philosophers of science since Norwood
Russell Hanson (and later Thomas Kuhn) have
argued that subjective factors are inevitably
involved in the development of scientific ideas,
and that facts are theory-laden because they
are identified from the perspective of PARADIGMS. At the same time, many philosophers
reject the notion that value judgments are
inevitably subjective, and, indeed, often argue
that widely accepted value judgments may
possess as much or more "objectivity" as many
scientific propositions.

Values permeate economics

The mainstream view, then, that there exists a
clear dividing line between positive and normative economics, is mistaken. Some traditional economists admit this when they allow
that an individual's value judgments influence
the views they develop. But this view is not
widely supported in the mainstream of economics. Even when it is, value judgments are
often understood as "individual motivation
may shape theory," rather than as "the world
views of economists in general influence the
very questions they ask, the significance they
attribute to some issues rather than others, and
the concepts they select." For example, neoclassical economics focuses only upon instrumental rationality, and then characterizes
decision making as rational when it is atomistic
and self-interested. But this selective characterization of behavior has never been given any
real scientific defense and, rather, represents a
theoretical commitment one must have to be
admitted to the ranks of neoclassical economists.
Thus, while it cannot be said that a clear
dividing line exists between positive and normative economics, it is still unlikely that anyone
would deny that there is a difference between
positive and normative statements. This suggests that the important issue for heterodox
economists is to understand how positive and
normative economics are related and influence
one another. Wilber (1996) puts this especially
well by rejecting the notion that value neutrality
makes sense, and by asking how our values
come to permeate economic reasoning (see
VALUE JUDGMENTS AND WORLD VIEWS) .

Characterizing and appraising value
judgments

One proposal for how to do this, deriving from
a reconsideration of the nature of values, is
discussed by Blaug (1992). He draws attention
to Nagel's (1961) distinction between two types
of value judgments: characterizing value judgments and appraising value judgments. Characterizing value judgments concern the choice
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of subject matter, the mode of investigation to
be followed and the criteria for judging results.
Characterizing value judgments involve the
sort of methodological judgments that are
indispensable to any science. Appraising value
judgments concern evaluative statements about
the world, and are the basis for our claims
about the relative desirability of different social
outcomes. Appraising value judgments are
usually considered to be normative economics,
but it is obvious that characterizing value
judgments are also normative and that they
are essential to science.
Hence, Blaug recognizes that the methodological judgments or ground rules employed by
any theory, when it makes various characterizing value judgments, are not free of the
normative commitments and appraising value
judgments the theory's practitioners hold. For
example, the neoclassical treatment of agents
as rational maximizers can well be argued to
depend on the view that it is desirable or
morally praiseworthy that individuals pursue
their own restricted well-being in market
contexts, and that doing so produces the
greatest social good through an "invisible
hand" process. At the same time, this view of
economic agents can easily be argued to rule
out the idea that individuals ought morally to
put justice in relations with others above
individual gain, and that failure to do so
furthers an alienated life dominated by impersonal market relations. Thus, value judgments of the appraising sort enter into
economists' selection of concepts and methods
at the most fundamental level, and we seem not
to have improved our understanding of "positive" and " normative" economics using
Nagel's distinction.
Reconstituting means and ends

A more promising approach, that also derives
from a reconsideration of the nature of values,
is to be found in institutionalist theory, which
denies from the outset that positive and
normative economics are mutually exclusive
domains or categories. Dugger and Waller
(1996), for example, accordingly argue that
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the posItive deals with our evaluating means
and the normative deals with evaluating ends.
More importantly, however, what counts as a
means and what counts as an end is relative to
the situation at hand. Indeed, something can be
a means on one occasion and an end on
another. Thus, an evolutionary approach,
which views the economy as being concerned
with historical processes and PATH DEPENDENCY, must be prepared to understand the
continual reconstitution of means and ends.
This explains the value permeation of
economic reasoning at a fundamental level,
and ushers in an alternative to normative
positive dualism in the form of Thorstein
Veblen's split between instrumental and ceremonial knowledge. Instrumental knowledge is
concerned with facts, getting things done and
solving problems. Ceremonial knowledge is
opposed to instrumental knowledge, and is
concerned with prestige, getting credit for
getting things done, and with exercising power
(see INSTRUMENTAL VALUE THEORY). Since,
throughout human history, the ceremonial has
tended to prevail over the instrumental, a
progressive economics aims at a critical apprehension of the use of power in the economy to
gain position and prestige. Social problems not social theories - should be the focus of
economics. Since society will never be free of
problems, the aims and ends of society are
always evolving, thus suggesting the idea of
"evotopia" (moving toward an evolving good
society) rather than utopia as a guiding view of
good economics (Hodgson 1995).
Ideology and analysis

Finally, Dobb's Marxist appraisal of the positive and normative deserves attention. Dobb
also begins with a re-characterization of values,
and reconstructs the traditional Humean dualism between "is" and "ought" in terms of a
distinction between IDEOLOGY and analysis. In
contrast to Hutchison's view of values and
ideology as an individual's personal predilections and commitments, Dobb defines ideology
as "a whole system of thought, or coordinated
set of beliefs and ideas, which form a frame-

North-South trade models

work, or higher-level group of related concepts,
for more specific and particular notions,
analyses, applications and conclusions" (1973 :
1). As such, individuals are often unconscious
of their ideological views, and tend to take
many of their elements as having been established as "true" rather than "believed propositions. " For example, Dobb takes the
traditional fact- value distinction itself as being
ideological in that most economists take it to be
rooted in incontrovertible truths rather than an
unexamined belief.
A view related to Dobb's needs to be
distinguished. Schumpeter (1954) wrote of the
difference between economic analysis and an
economist's vision of the nature of reality and
the problems at hand. The latter is ideological,
and involves "a preanalytical cognitive act"
which must precede "analytic effort in any
field" and which may also "re-enter the history
of every established science each time somebody teaches us to see things in a light of which
the source is not to be found in the facts
methods, and results of the pre-existing state of
the science" (Schumpeter 1954: 41). Yet,
Schumpeter also claims that economic analysis
can still be thought to be objective and
independent of ideological views, indeed as a
" box of tools" of a purely instrumental nature
upon which scientific progress depends. Dobb
rightly challenges this conception, arguing that
this formal view of concepts as tools overlooks
the way in which tools are developed for
theoretical and ideological purposes.
Thus, if we are to employ a distinction
between positive and normative economics, it
must be with great caution and an awareness of
the ways in which values inevitably permeate
theories. It is true that descriptive and prescriptive language differ and that there are important
differences between facts and values. However,
economics is highly value-laden and, thus,
understanding the role of values in economics
is necessary to doing good economics.

See also:
ethics and morality ; modernism and
postmodernism; natural rights; rhetoric
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North-South trade models
Models of North- South trade examine the
interaction of two regions: the rich North (also
called the metropolis, core or center) comprising "developed" economies, and the poor
South (also called the periphery) comprising
"less-developed" economies. Special reference
is placed on international trade, factor movements, technology transfer and related factors.
They consider the links between the two
regions, and usually highlight the dynamic
interaction between, and the structural differences between, the two regions. They can be
seen as a reaction to the dominant microtheoretic Heckscher- Ohlin- Samuelson (HOS)
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